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 For nearly two decades a "quiet revolution" has been occurring in the American system of 
justice. There has been a dramatic growth in the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve 
disputes that might otherwise be handled through litigation. We define ADR as the use of any form of 
mediation or arbitration as a substitute for the public judicial or administrative process available to 
resolve a dispute.1 In the United States, mediation, arbitration, and their variants are ordinarily private 
processes in which the disputants themselves select, hire, and pay the third-party neutral who resolves, 
or attempts to resolve, their dispute. 
 In some industries, such as construction, ADR has been used extensively for several decades; 
similarly, in some types of disputes, such as those arising in labor-management relations, ADR (in the 
form of arbitration and mediation) has been used for nearly a century, but most especially since the end 
of World War II. In most industries and in most types of disputes, however, the use of ADR is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. The diffusion of ADR began in earnest in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s.2 
Many American corporations are now using ADR routinely to resolve a wide variety of disputes. In 1997, 
two of the authors of this paper surveyed the corporate counsel of the Fortune 1000 and discovered 
that eighty-eight percent of the respondents reported using mediation and seventy-nine percent 
reported using arbitration at least once in the preceding three years. In fact, the "typical" (or median) 
                                                          
1 David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, The Appropriate Resolution of Corporate Disputes: A Report on the Growing 
Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations (1998). 
2 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 Ohio 
St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1 (2000); E. Wendy Trachte-Huber & Stephen K. Huber, Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
Strategies for Law and Business (1996); U.S. Comm. on the Future of Worker-Management Relations ("The Dunlop 
Commission"), Report and Recommendations (1994). 
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corporation had used ADR on numerous occasions in almost every kind of dispute, particularly 
commercial, contractual, and employment disputes.3 
 We found that a vanguard of corporations had moved beyond the use of ADR as a matter of 
policy or practice and had adopted the use of some form of a conflict management system.4 A small 
number of corporations had rejected the use of ADR entirely. On the basis of our research, we realized 
that there was a great deal of variance in the choice of a conflict management strategy by U.S. 
corporations, ranging from traditional reliance on litigation, to experimentation with various ADR 
techniques, to the adoption of a full-blown conflict management system. The variance in the corporate 
choice of a conflict management strategy intrigued us greatly, and in the next phase of our research we 
began to develop a model that would explain this variance. 
 The meat of this paper is an exposition of the analytical model we developed that we believe 
explains the choice of strategy. We readily acknowledge that we have not yet rigorously tested the 
central tenets of our model — although we believe it would be possible to do so. We maintain, however, 
that our model is supported by the evidence we have obtained to date, including not only the data in 
our extensive 1997 survey but also additional evidence we have gathered in approximately twenty 
corporate case studies we have conducted over the past three years. 
 Our survey and field research have led us to some tentative conclusions that do not conform to 
the conventional wisdom of our field. From its inception, ADR has been controversial. On the one hand, 
ADR has been embraced by a coterie of "champions" who have always believed that its advantages over 
litigation were so obvious and compelling it would only be a matter of time before ADR was adopted 
                                                          
3 Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 1, at 9. 
4 ADR in the Workplace, Track I Committee, Guidelines for the Design of Integrated Conflict Management Systems 
within Organizations (2000); Cathy A. Costantino & Christina Sickles Merchant, Designing Conflict Management 
Systems: A Guide to Creating Productive and Healthy Organizations (1996). 
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universally. These champions have also been missionaries, proselytizing their faith in all quarters and 
making numerous converts. Like all true believers, ADR champions cannot understand why others have 
not yet "gotten the faith." On the other hand, there has always been a group of ADR opponents who 
believe ADR undercuts our system of justice and must be resisted.5 ADR champions believe in the 
inevitability of ADR, while ADR opponents believe the movement to ADR can be stopped and even 
reversed. On balance, we believe in ADR's merits and share many of its champions' convictions. Our 
research — which is based on the analytical model we present in this paper — suggests, however, that 
there is nothing inevitable about the ultimate triumph of ADR. 
 Indeed, in some of the organizations we have studied, the use of ADR may have already peaked 
and a return to more traditional approaches to conflict management may have begun. The research we 
have conducted underscores our belief that the future of ADR in American corporations depends on the 
extent to which ADR policies and practices become institutionalized — that is, whether they become a 
more or less permanent part of the culture of the organization. Of course the future is uncertain, but it 
is entirely possible that the worst fears of ADR's champions — and the fondest hopes of its opponents — 
may come to pass. Instead of advancing steadily into the future, ADR may find itself in retreat. Because 
we personally believe the advantages of ADR significantly outweigh its disadvantages, we would regret 
such a development. As social scientists, however, we need to report the truth as we find it. We hope 
our research will serve to strengthen the resolve of ADR's proponents rather than give comfort to its 
opponents. 
                                                          
5 See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 
1990s, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1017 (1996). 
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The Advantages and Disadvantages of ADR 
 Many organizations have adopted ADR because they believe it is a means of circumventing the 
expensive, time-consuming features of conventional litigation. 
 The parties in a conventional court proceeding often invest considerable money and energy, 
from the time of the initial filings in a court suit, through interrogatories and depositions, to the time of 
the trial itself, and, in ninety percent of all cases, negotiate a settlement "on the courthouse steps" or in 
the judge's chambers. The costs of litigation include, of course, not only the awards or settlements 
themselves but also the so-called "transaction costs" associated with settling disputes, including the 
costs of inside and outside legal counsel, of expert witnesses, of gathering documents and engaging in 
discovery, and so forth. In the U.S. the transaction costs of litigation are often two or three times greater 
than the settlements themselves.6 Moreover, this calculation does not include the value to the 
disputants of the time saved as a consequence of resolving disputes quickly — reducing these 
"opportunity costs" may be the largest benefit of using ADR. 
 In theory, ADR is a means of circumventing the expensive, time-consuming features of 
conventional litigation. ADR processes are not usually confined by the legal rules that govern court 
proceedings, such as those governing the admissibility of evidence and the examination of witnesses. 
Arbitrators, for example, may conduct expedited hearings, dispense with pre- or post-hearing briefs, 
consider hearsay evidence, and allow advocates to lead their witnesses. Discovery is almost never a part 
of the mediation process and is used only slightly more often in arbitration, usually when the parties 
request it. The parties have significantly more control over the ADR process than they would over a 
court proceeding. Within broad limits, the parties can design the ADR procedure themselves. Because 
                                                          
6 David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In Search of Control: The Corporate Embrace of ADR, 1 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 
133,142 (1998). 
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the disputants often jointly select the neutral, they are likely to have more trust and confidence in the 
neutral's ability than they would in a judge who otherwise would be assigned to hear the case. 
Moreover, compliance with the eventual settlement is less likely to be a problem when the disputants 
have controlled the process that produced the outcome. 
 Although there are many advantages to the use of ADR, some observers contend that it poses a 
substantial threat to the system of justice in the United States. ADR in effect transfers the dispute 
resolution function from public forums (the courts, regulatory agencies, etc.) to private ones. Typically, 
ADR proceedings are private and confidential, in contrast to court decisions. For example, arbitration 
decisions are seldom published because they are considered the property of the disputants. The 
increasing privatization of the American system of justice, critics maintain, poses serious challenges for 
the guarantees of due process and equality under the law.7 
Data Collection and Methodology 
 Several years ago we began a long-term study of the use of ADR by American corporations. In 
our 1997 survey of the Fortune 1000 companies' use of ADR, we succeeded in interviewing the counsel, 
deputy counsel, or chief litigator in 606 of these corporations.8 We then began a series of onsite 
interviews at approximately twenty of the corporations that had been included in the survey, with a 
view toward compiling comprehensive case studies about these organizations' dispute resolution 
strategies and policies. The corporations included in our series of case studies are listed in the Appendix. 
In conducting these corporate case studies, we purposely included companies that had a variety of 
                                                          
7 7Michael Delikat & Rene Kathawala, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims Under Pre-Dispute 
Agreements: Will Gilmer Survive? 16 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 83 (1998); Stone, supra note 5, at 1036. 
8 Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 6. 
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dispute resolution policies, ranging from strongly pro-ADR to strongly anti-ADR. We also tried very hard 
(but with incomplete success) to include companies from a wide variety of industries.  
To select the companies we wanted to use for case studies, we used the results of a question 
contained in our 1997 survey that dealt with corporate policy toward ADR. Responses to that question 
revealed significant variation in the ADR policies and procedures adopted by major U.S. corporations. On 
one end of the spectrum, a handful of corporations used ADR as a matter of policy in all types of 
disputes. On the other end of the spectrum, a small number never used ADR in any type of dispute. The 
vast majority of corporations, however, had a pragmatic view of ADR, using it when they thought it was 
appropriate but not fully embracing nor completely rejecting it as a matter of policy.9 We attempted to 
construct a list of companies for interviews that represented the full spectrum of opinion on the subject 
from those who "always attempted to use ADR" to those who "never use ADR." We also felt it critical to 
get a wide spectrum of opinion within the company. Therefore, we attempted to interview not just 
corporate counsel, but also the chief financial and human resource officers. We hypothesized that one 
important aspect of the development of conflict management systems would be the integration of ADR 
policies across functional lines of responsibility and dispute areas. While we were not successful in 
gaining complete access to all the companies we sought to include in our sample, we do believe we 
were able to gain enough access to get an understanding of policy development and strategic choice 
regarding ADR in a sufficient number of the companies we had targeted. In some cases, we were not 
able to obtain permission to reveal the names of the officials we interviewed or to identify the names of 
the companies that provided information. Throughout this paper, we will sometimes reveal the names 
of companies or individuals, but in other cases we will not. 
                                                          
9 Id. 
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 We intentionally concentrated on corporate decision-making for two principal reasons. First, 
although there has been considerable research on various aspects of the operation of various ADR 
procedures, there has been very little research on the formation of corporate strategies.10 It was 
obvious to us that understanding the growth and diffusion in ADR policies throughout American 
business, as well as the barriers to that diffusion, required a clear delineation of how top managers 
made decisions on the management of disputes. Second, our 1997 corporate survey revealed that some 
corporations were moving beyond the use of ADR policies to the adoption of conflict management 
systems. We were especially interested in understanding the transition to a systems approach 
undertaken by a vanguard of American corporations. In addition to our onsite interviews, we have also 
been collecting publicly available information on the use of ADR by other businesses and large 
organizations. This paper presents our conclusions regarding the current use of ADR and the potential 
for its further development in the United States. 
An Analytical Model of the Corporation's Choice of Conflict Management Strategies 
 ADR seems to have arisen largely as a response to changes — some long-term and some short-
term — in the corporate environment, that made its use an attractive alternative to conventional 
litigation. These environmental changes, in turn, were filtered through a set of organizational 
characteristics. Our model is depicted in Figure 1. As the figure shows, we divide the dependent variable 
in the model — the corporation's choice of conflict management strategy — into three categories, which 
we label contend, settle, and prevent. Obviously, these categories are somewhat arbitrary. In truth, 
corporate strategy ranges across a spectrum, and grouping large numbers of corporations in a particular 
category may possibly blur important differences across corporations in that category. To some degree 
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham & Denise R. Chachere, Dispute Resolution in Employment: The Need for Research, in 
Employment Dispute Resolution and Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace 95 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffery H. 
Keefe eds., 1999); U.S. General Accounting Office, ADR: Employers' Experience with ADR in the Workplace (1997). 
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each corporation we have studied had its own unique conflict management strategy, tailored to fit its 
own objectives and circumstances. We defend our three-part categorization because we believe it 
captures the most fundamental differences in corporate strategy that we observed in our research. 
 In the contend category we include those corporations that clearly prefer litigation to ADR. 
These are corporations that never or rarely use any ADR technique to resolve a dispute. They reject the 
use of ADR as a matter of corporate policy, although occasionally some of them will accept the use of 
mediation or arbitration in a particular dispute. In the settle category, we include a majority of the major 
corporations in the United States. Again, we recognize that there are critical differences in corporate 
strategy across this large group of companies, but in general these corporations use ADR either as a 
matter of policy or on an ad hoc basis in a variety of different types of disputes. In the prevent category 
we include corporations that apparently use ADR in all types of disputes as a matter of policy. In this 
category are the corporations that have developed conflict management systems; that is, they do not 
merely use a particular dispute resolution technique as a matter of practice or even policy, but have 
instead developed a comprehensive set of policies designed to prevent (if possible) or to manage 
conflict. We will have more to say about conflict management systems later in the paper, but at this 
point we should note that a corporation that has adopted a system is one that has moved from a 
reactive to a proactive approach to conflict management. In a conflict management system, the 
responsibility for preventing and resolving disputes is not confined to the counsel's office but has been 
extended to virtually every manager in the organization. 
 As Figure 1 shows, we maintain that a corporation's choice of conflict management strategy is a 
function of two factors: environmental and organizational. In the environmental category we list several 
exogenous variables that we hypothesize influence the corporation's choice of strategy. For example, 
we hypothesize that market factors influence the corporation's choice of strategy: corporations 
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operating in more competitive, global markets tend to rely on ADR more heavily than do corporations in 
less competitive markets. The underlying logic supporting this proposition is straightforward: 
corporations in competitive markets need to be more diligent about controlling and reducing their costs, 
and ADR is a means of controlling and reducing the costs of dispute resolution. Corporations in less 
competitive markets have less need to be concerned with the costs of litigation. In a later section of the 
paper we will discuss all the environmental variables we list in Figure 1. 
 Our model postulates that these variables operate through a set of organizational 
characteristics. For example, we hypothesize that a corporation is more likely to rely on ADR if it has 
experienced a "precipitating event," such as a major multi-million dollar lawsuit, than a corporation that 
has not experienced such an event. Exogenous environmental factors may be necessary conditions for a 
corporation to adopt a pro-ADR policy, but they may not be sufficient conditions. In our model we 
hypothesize, for example, that a corporation which both operates in a competitive market and has been 
a defendant in a major lawsuit is much more likely to have a pro-ADR policy than a corporation which 
operates in a competitive market but has not experienced that type of "precipitating event." In other 
words, in our model it is the interaction of environmental and organizational (or exogenous and 
endogenous) variables that influence a corporation's choice of strategy. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 Our model does not suggest that environmental factors invariably lead to a particular conflict 
management strategy. Many corporations experienced rising litigation costs in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
not all corporations responded to that factor by adopting pro-ADR policies. A corporation that faces an 
escalation in litigation costs presumably considers how it might reduce or minimize those costs. It might 
choose ADR as a cost-saving measure. Or it might respond in a different fashion, by seeking other means 
of more efficiently managing litigation for example. Indeed, if the corporation has reason to believe the 
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rise of litigation costs is a transient phenomenon, it may decide to do nothing in response. How an 
organization makes decisions in the face of changing environmental conditions is a complex 
phenomenon. Clearly, corporate "culture" plays a critical role, but culture is an amorphous term 
requiring definition. The culture of a corporation reflects the values, experiences, and belief structures 
of the organization's decision makers. Similar corporations faced with a common set of environmental 
challenges might choose very different conflict management strategies and, in fact, this is a situation we 
observed in our research. For example, one of the companies in our study, PECO Energy (now Exelon), 
adopted a sophisticated conflict management system, but most other utility companies have not. 
Another company in our study, Haliburton (and its construction subsidiary, Brown and Root), pioneered 
the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment, but most other companies in 
the construction business have not used them. The Zachry Construction Company, a large contractor 
located in San Antonio, has consciously considered Brown and Root's approach and decided not to 
adopt it. These decisions, we maintain, are a function of the organizational variables listed in Figure 1. 
 In our 1997 survey of corporate counsel, we asked the respondents a series of questions 
regarding how they would characterize their organizations' conflict management strategies.11 On the 
basis of their responses to these questions, we have been able to group the corporations into the 
contend, settle, and prevent categories. Table 1 shows the proportion of Fortune 1000 companies in 
each of these categories. These proportions must be considered rough estimates, subject to the caveats 
previously discussed. Moreover, the proportion of companies in each category is constantly shifting. 
Presumably, the number of corporations in the contend category is shrinking and the number in the 
prevent category is growing, but this is by no means certain. Nevertheless, we estimate that about nine 
percent of major U.S. corporations reject ADR and belong in the contend category, seventy-four percent 
                                                          
11 For an explanation of our methodology, see Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 1, at 9-14. 
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belong in the broad settle category, and seventeen percent strongly favor ADR, have some form of a 
system, and accordingly belong in the prevent category. 
 After we grouped the corporations in our sample into the three conflict management strategies, 
we were able to perform some simple analyses to determine the correlates of the corporation's choice 
of strategy. We found that the corporation's choice of conflict management strategy was highly 
correlated with size, as measured by either revenue or number of employees: corporations in the 
prevent category tended to be significantly larger than corporations in the contend category (albeit all 
corporations in the Fortune 1000 have revenues greater than a billion dollars) and corporations in the 
settle category tended to fall in the middle range. Market pressure also proved to be related to 
corporate choice of strategy. Corporations facing greater market pressure (as measured by industry 
concentration ratios) tended to choose the prevent or systems strategy, while corporations facing less 
market pressure tended to choose the contend or traditional litigation strategy. Once again, 
corporations in the settle category tended to fall in the middle. Lastly, we found a pattern between 
choice of strategy and industry (denoted by the two-digit SIC industry in which the corporation 
conducted its primary business). For example, as Table 1 shows, corporations choosing the prevent 
strategy tend to cluster in financial services, insurance, construction, and nondurable manufacturing. 
But industry patterns in corporate strategy are harder to discern than Table 1 might suggest. As the 
PECO and Haliburton examples suggest, the variance in corporate strategy within an industry can be 
very great indeed. In Table 1, construction is listed in both the contend and the prevent categories 
because there are corporations in the construction industry that fall on either end of the spectrum. 
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ON THE CORPORATION'S CHOICE OF A CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
 In this section of the paper, we provide a more detailed discussion of a corporation's choice of a 
conflict management strategy, drawing especially on our fieldwork and case studies. 
Contend 
 In both our corporate survey and our field studies, we discovered that some corporations — 
albeit a shrinking minority — have chosen to reject almost any use of ADR and instead have decided to 
contend any claim or charge brought against the organization. The contend group in Table 1 consists of 
those corporations that, in the light of their own environmental setting and organizational 
characteristics, have chosen to continue their traditional approach to litigation. In our 1997 survey,  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
these corporations responded that when their corporation is either a defendant or plaintiff in a lawsuit, 
they prefer to "litigate always." We categorize them as contenders because the top managers and 
lawyers in these corporations, as a matter of conscious policy, rigorously defend their interests in 
virtually every lawsuit or legal proceeding in which they are involved. As a group, they are the most 
likely to see the downside of negotiation; they put a heavy premium on "winning" legal contests and 
they understand that negotiators usually need to compromise and therefore cannot "win" all the time. 
They tend to view legal proceedings, therefore, as zero-sum games and they do not fear the risk of 
conceiving every legal matter as a "win-lose" contest. 
 We talked to the Senior Vice-Chairman and Chief Administrative Officer of the Emerson Electric 
Corporation, a successful multi-billion dollar international corporation headquartered in St. Louis, 
Missouri, and later invited him to participate in a session we were asked to organize for the 1998 Forbes 
Magazine "superconference" on ADR. The Vice-Chairman began his presentation on that occasion by 
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showing a slide that reproduced the American Revolutionary War flag that has a rendering of a coiled 
snake and the warning, "Don't Tread on Me." He used the flag as a symbol of Emerson's strategy on 
litigation management. On any given claim, the Vice-Chairman explained, Emerson will decide whether 
the corporation is right or wrong. If the corporation believes it is wrong, it will readily concede the issue 
and attempt to settle the case. Such cases are relatively rare, according to the Vice- Chairman. When the 
corporation decides it is right, however, it will make every effort to defend its position and is unwilling 
to make compromises or concessions to an opposing party. It has been important to Emerson to 
establish a reputation as an organization that will fight all claims that (in its view) lack merit. The use of 
mediation, arbitration, or any other form of ADR, in Emerson's view, undercuts the corporation's conflict 
management strategy. Over time, the Vice-Chairman maintained, this policy of contending almost every 
claim has had the effect of deterring lawsuits and reducing the corporation's legal costs. 
 Not every corporation that we place in the contend category has adopted such a stringent, if 
principled, approach to conflict management. Some contenders are, arguably, somewhat more 
pragmatic and flexible than Emerson. For example, we conducted interviews at the Schering-Plough 
Corporation, one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world. Schering-Plough produces the 
best-selling allergy medication, Claritin. In common with other manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, 
Schering-Plough is often sued by users of its products who claim the drugs they used did not have the 
intended effects. Also, Schering-Plough has been the defendant in several expensive lawsuits involving 
claims by current or former employees. The corporation's litigation experience led it to undertake a 
comprehensive study of the use of ADR as a substitute for the corporation's policy of contending. The 
vice-president of human resources and the corporation's deputy counsel conducted a thorough year-
long study and concluded that the systematic use of ADR might indeed save the corporation time and 
money. Nevertheless, they did not recommend that the corporation adopt the use of ADR as a matter of 
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policy. In the course of their study, they discovered that middle managers at Schering-Plough thought 
any use of ADR threatened their authority. Middle managers and supervisors make decisions that are 
the source of many corporate disputes. They want their decisions to be supported by the corporation. If 
top management uses ADR to arrive at negotiated agreements that compromise these decisions, middle 
managers may feel their authority is undermined. In the end, Schering-Plough decided not to adopt the 
use of ADR as a matter of policy (although it will use mediation in selected cases) because its middle 
managers firmly believed such a policy would undercut their authority.12 
 Hewlett Packard, another firm we studied, also belongs in the contend category. Hewlett 
Packard, we believe, is typical of the high-tech firms in Silicon Valley. The success of these firms depends 
in part on their ability to innovate new technologies, and they attempt to retain control of their 
innovations through the use of patents and copyrights. Intellectual property is in many ways the 
lifeblood of these corporations, and they are prepared to fight anyone who threatens their intellectual 
property rights. For Hewlett Packard, and for many other Silicon Valley firms, the stakes in many 
lawsuits are so high the idea of negotiating or mediating a compromise settlement cannot be 
considered. The use of ADR in the Silicon Valley also seems to run counter to the entrepreneurial culture 
prevalent there. Bill Gates was reluctant to negotiate a settlement of the government's antitrust case 
against Microsoft, and the effort by federal court judge Richard Posner to mediate a settlement failed. 
However, Gates was prepared to make some significant concessions and Posner came very close to 
mediating a settlement in the case.13 
 In sum, the firms we examined in the contend category have little interest in ADR, formally or 
informally. They may express some discontent with the American legal system, but in general they are 
                                                          
12 Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 1, at 24. 
13 Ken Auletta, World War 3.0: Microsoft and Its Enemies (2001). 
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quite prepared to litigate when they believe it is necessary and in some cases they even relish the 
opportunity. 
Settle 
 Based on our research, we believe the overwhelming majority of U.S. corporations routinely 
attempt to settle almost all complaints and claims against them. Some corporations may do this as a 
matter of conscious policy and some as a matter of established practice. These corporations have 
neither wholeheartedly adopted nor categorically rejected the use of ADR. Instead, they usually 
approach conflict management in a pragmatic and flexible fashion while, at the same time, adhering to 
their own core values and principles. They tend to view conflict management less in strategic terms and 
more in terms of tactical choice. The tactics and techniques they use in a particular case are normally 
chosen on an ad hoc basis and depend on the specific circumstances of the case. They view the 
techniques of ADR as part of a toolkit that includes other options, including contending. 
 To the extent that a corporation in this category pursues a deliberate litigation or conflict 
management strategy, it is driven by counsel's office, often working collaboratively with outside counsel, 
the chief financial officer, the human resource function, or another appropriate part of the corporation. 
The counsel's office seldom needs to involve top management directly in its day-to-day handling of 
claims and complaints, unless the corporation's lawyers find themselves in a situation that potentially 
represents a significant financial liability for the corporation or a critical matter of principle and 
precedent. 
 Corporations in the settle category take one or both of two approaches to the use of ADR. One 
approach is to use ADR on a post-dispute basis and the other is to use it on a pre-dispute basis. A 
corporation that uses ADR on a post-dispute basis will attempt to use mediation, arbitration, or one of 
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their variants after a dispute between the corporation and another party has arisen. These corporations 
are prepared to pursue litigation in a particular case when they believe the stakes involved, either in 
terms of money or principle, dictate that choice. In the majority of cases, however, they are prepared to 
negotiate a settlement of a dispute. In a typical corporation, the counsel's office, frequently relying on 
the advice of outside counsel, decides at each stage of a case whether negotiating an agreement or 
proceeding to the next stage of the case is the wise course of action. In these corporations the use of 
ADR is simply part of the litigation manager's toolkit. At some point in the processing of a particular 
case, the lawyers representing the corporation and the other party (or parties) in the dispute come to 
believe that the use of mediation or arbitration is a desirable alternative to pursuing the next stage of 
litigation. 
 The other approach a corporation can choose is the use of ADR on a pre-dispute basis. When a 
corporation uses ADR on a pre-dispute basis, it identifies certain types of transactions that are prone to 
disputes and decides as a matter of policy to use ADR to resolve such disputes. Typically, corporations 
using pre-dispute ADR will seek to include an ADR provision in contracts covering the transactions in 
question. A corporation may include an ADR provision in all of its construction contracts, product 
warranties, or executive salary agreements. For example, almost all-automobile manufacturers include 
an arbitration provision in the leases signed by their customers. Computer manufacturers routinely 
include arbitration provisions in their warranties; customers who sign these warranties may or may not 
realize that if they have a product liability claim against the manufacturer they are required to have the 
claim arbitrated and cannot pursue a lawsuit in the courts. A growing number of employers require their 
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employees to sign mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements, a practice sanctioned by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.14 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.15 
 In our 1997 survey, many of the corporate lawyers we interviewed told us their corporation had 
adopted a pro-ADR policy. We discovered in our field work, however, that counsel's view of the 
corporation's conflict management strategy wasn't always shared by other key members of the 
organization. Indeed, in a few cases corporate managers had very little awareness of, or no knowledge 
at all about, counsel's pro-ADR policies. On the basis of our survey of the Fortune 1000, we might have 
categorized a corporation as "strongly pro-ADR," but the counsel's view of the corporation's conflict 
management strategy had not necessarily penetrated other parts of the organization. In this respect, the 
results we obtained in our survey might have been somewhat misleading. In that survey we only 
interviewed one respondent in each corporation, usually the counsel or one of his or her deputies. We 
did not fully realize until we conducted our field research that the respondent we had interviewed in the 
counsel's office did not always speak for his or her colleagues — with hindsight, not a surprising 
phenomenon. 
 For example, we conducted several interviews in a large Midwestern corporation that, on the 
basis of our earlier survey, we had classified as "strongly pro-ADR." When we arrived on the scene, 
however, we found that the respondent we had interviewed was the corporation's staunchest ADR 
"champion." His colleagues, both inside and outside the counsel's office, did not share his views, nor did 
they agree that the corporation had adopted ADR as a matter of policy. This corporation clearly did use 
ADR, but ADR was less a matter of corporate policy and more a matter of tactical choice made within 
the counsel's office. When we returned to Ithaca, we re-categorized the corporation in our database. 
                                                          
14 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
15 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
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Obviously, however, we were not able to do this exercise for all the corporations in our survey, so the 
presence of respondent bias — a common problem in survey research — needs to be considered in 
interpreting our survey findings. 
 Corporations that we include in the settle category typically have a strong preference for 
negotiating settlements of claims whenever it seems feasible (in some rough cost-benefit sense) to do 
so. In contrast to contenders, these corporations seem to attach less value to winning and more value to 
resolving disputes in an expeditious fashion. Settlers do not normally view all lawsuits and legal 
proceedings as zero-sum games. They are more likely to view conflict management as an exercise in 
"mixed-motive decision making."16 Individuals and organizations in a mixed-motive "game" understand 
that sometimes the game is a zero-sum (or win-lose) one, and sometimes the game is a variable sum (or 
win-win) one; they adopt strategies and tactics suitable to the type of game they believe they are 
playing. Similarly, settlers continually make assessments of the character of the claims they are handling 
and choose a conflict management strategy that they believe fits the nature of the claim. 
 In the settle category, therefore, corporate conflict management is reactive and contingent. In 
many of the corporations we studied, counsel's office viewed the use of ADR in certain classes of 
disputes as an experiment. The corporate representatives we interviewed often had an open mind 
about ADR and wanted to let their experience with its use guide them on the possibility of adopting ADR 
as a corporate policy. We began to call some of the corporations in the settle category incrementalists. 
Their mode of operation was to experiment with ADR in some types of disputes (say, employment 
cases), and, if they were satisfied with its use in those cases, to extend its use to other types of disputes. 
                                                          
16 The term is associated with the work of Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie. See, e.g., Richard E. Walton & 
Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System (2d ed. 
1991); see also Richard E. Walton et al., Strategic Negotiations: A Theory of Change in Labor- Management 
Relations 41 (1994). 
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 For example, we conducted interviews at Kaufman and Broad, one of the nation's largest home 
builders. (By some measures Kaufman and Broad is the largest home-builder in the United States, 
although its operations are concentrated in California, where it is headquartered, and the Southwest. In 
1999, Kaufman and Broad built 21,000 homes.) Kaufman and Broad routinely includes mediation and 
arbitration clauses in the home-building contracts it signs with customers. Customer claims of defects in 
the homes they have purchased are submitted to mediation and, in some cases, to arbitration. 
Customers waive their right to sue Kaufman and Broad when a claim is deemed suitable for arbitration. 
Over the years Kaufman and Broad developed a very favorable view of the use of ADR in its home-
building contracts. There came a time when it decided to adopt mandatory pre-dispute arbitration for 
its sales staff, where disputes over commissions were a frequent occurrence. 
 We found this pattern of incrementalism in several of the corporations we studied. We 
observed that ADR was initially an innovation adopted for limited use in one class of disputes, 
subsequently proved to be successful, and then was diffused into other arenas. We entered the field 
phase of our research with a tentative hypothesis that proved to be incorrect, however. We expected to 
find that most corporations would use what we would term an integrated conflict management 
strategy, by which we mean a more-or-less standard corporate-wide approach to conflict management. 
We found in fact that most corporations do not have an integrated conflict management strategy but, 
instead, have a patchwork (more kindly, a pragmatic and flexible) approach to conflict management, 
using one strategy in one class of disputes and a totally different strategy in other classes of disputes. 
 At this stage of our research we have formed a revised hypothesis regarding the integration of a 
corporation's conflict management strategies. We now believe that corporate structure strongly 
influences the choice of conflict management strategies. In particular, the degree of centralization of 
authority within the corporation is a significant determinant. All other things equal, a highly centralized 
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organization tends to have a standard approach for conflict management, while a decentralized 
organization does not. For example, we conducted interviews at both Warner Bros, and Universal 
Studios in Los Angeles. Warner Bros, is a subsidiary of AOL Time Warner and Universal is owned by The 
Seagram Company Ltd. Both studios, however, have considerable autonomy, and both have an 
approach to ADR distinctly different from the approach of their parent organizations. 
 It is a truism that the culture — the traditions, norms, and standards of behavior — of producing 
motion pictures and television programs differs from the culture of publishing magazines or providing 
internet services. The vast majority of studio employees, including actors, directors, writers, and 
musicians, are unionized and have a long history of craft bargaining.17 These traditions have strongly 
influenced the studios' attitudes toward ADR — and not necessarily in a positive direction. In common 
with other unionized employers, the experience that Warner Bros, and Universal have had with the use 
of mediation and arbitration in collective bargaining has, to say the least, colored their view of the use of 
ADR in other types of disputes. In the motion picture industry arbitration clauses are routinely included 
in executive contracts and in many construction contracts. But we would characterize the studios' 
attitudes toward ADR as cautious and even wary, and by no means has the experience in Hollywood 
spilled over into other business units in the parent corporations. 
 It is also the case that the perception of a negative experience with ADR can deter its diffusion 
to other parts of an organization. For example, we conducted interviews at Kaiser Permanente at its 
headquarters in Oakland, California. Kaiser Permanente, of course, is not a corporation but is America's 
largest not-for-profit health maintenance organization. It serves nearly nine million members in 
seventeen states. Kaiser requires patients treated by its doctors and medical facilities to sign mandatory 
                                                          
17 17See, e.g., Lois S. Gray & Ronald L. Seeber, Under the Stars: Essays on Labor Relations in Arts and 
Entertainment 113-80 (1996). 
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arbitration agreements. Such agreements require patients with medical claims, including allegations of 
malpractice, to waive their right to sue and submit them to arbitration. It was highly embarrassed by a 
couple of arbitration cases, reported extensively by the San Francisco Chronicle, that allegedly 
demonstrated the problems of mandatory arbitration.18 (In 1999, The Institute for Civil Justice 
conducted a study of the use of arbitration in healthcare disputes. It discovered that, on the one hand, 
only nine percent of all physicians ask patients to sign arbitration agreements. On the other hand, 
seventy-one percent of all HMO insurance plans ask new enrollees to sign arbitration agreements. In 
most cases, however, these agreements only cover disputes over benefits and do not cover malpractice 
claims.) As a consequence of its experience in arbitration, including the negative publicity, Kaiser revised 
but did not abandon its mandatory arbitration policy. In 1999, it decided to turn over the administration 
of the arbitration procedure to the American Arbitration Association instead of managing the procedure 
itself. By doing so Kaiser clearly hoped to reassure the public that its arbitration procedure was an 
impartial and fair one. Again, however, Kaiser's difficulties in this regard have limited the diffusion of 
ADR to other types of disputes. 
 Our respondents at the USX Corporation told us the corporation had a "tradition of litigation" 
but in recent years it had become more open-minded about the use of ADR. USX is, apparently, one of 
many corporations experimenting with alternatives to litigation. It has been motivated by the growing 
burden of statutory employment cases and its potential liability in asbestos lawsuits. We also conducted 
interviews at Mirage Resorts, Inc. One of the largest hotel and casino operators in the country, Mirage 
also owns the Bellagio, Golden Nugget, and Treasure Island hotels in Las Vegas, the Beau Rivage in 
Biloxi, Mississippi, and (at the time we conducted our interviews) was developing a large hotel and 
casino in Atlantic City. For many years, until he sold the corporation to MGM Grand in 2000, Mirage was 
                                                          
18 See, e.g., S.F. Chron., Nov. 29, 1998, at 7; New Times, Dec. 9, 1999. 
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owned by Steve Wynn.19 We were impressed with the apparent extent to which Wynn directed policy in 
every corner of the corporation. In the gaming industry, lawsuits are an everyday occurrence, and under 
Wynn Mirage had more than its fair share. Wynn's legal battles with Donald Trump were an ongoing 
saga in the late 1990s.20 But Wynn, in many ways the quintessential pragmatist, was always prepared to 
experiment with alternative means of settling disputes. Consequently, Mirage attorneys were disposed 
to use mediation, particularly in cases where the stakes weren't very high. In our view Mirage was a 
classic example of how top management ultimately drives the choice of a conflict management strategy. 
 As we noted earlier, each corporation is a story unto itself. A diverse set of circumstances and 
motivations influence the choice of a conflict management strategy in each of the companies we 
studied. Nevertheless, we think a careful observer can discern clear patterns in the evidence. In the 
settle category are a very large number of corporations pursuing a variety of specific strategies. All of 
them, however, use ADR regularly, if not routinely, as a means of managing disputes. 
Prevent 
 All of the corporations we include in the prevent category told us in our 1997 survey that, as a 
matter of policy, they always use ADR to resolve at least one type of potential dispute (e.g., 
employment, commercial, etc.). Most of the corporations in this category told us they always use ADR in 
a variety of different types of disputes, and some told us they always use ADR in all disputes. A 
significant number of these corporations have adopted a conflict management system, and we now 
need to explain more thoroughly what we mean by the term "system."21 There is no general agreement, 
                                                          
19 Michael Brick, MGM Grand to Acquire Mirage Resorts for $4.4 Billion, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 2000. 
20 See., e.g., AP Newswires, Nov. 2,1999; Dow Jones Bus. News, Apr. 22,1999. 
21 For classic works on the system concept, see, for example, Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory: A 
New Approach to the Unity of Science, 23 Hum. Biology 302 (1951), and Kenneth E. Boulding, General Systems — 
The Skeleton of Science, 2 Mgmt. Sci. 197 (1956). 
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even among experts, on the precise definition of a conflict management system.22 An authentic system 
is not merely a practice, procedure, or policy. Although it may incorporate practice, procedure, and 
policy, a system is something more encompassing. We prefer the definition of a system contained in 
Guidelines for the Design of Integrated Conflict Management Systems within Organizations, a report 
prepared for the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution by an ad hoc committee.23 The report 
says an effective conflict management system has five characteristics. We paraphrase the report's 
prescription below: 
(1) Scope. A system should have the broadest feasible scope, allowing all types of problems to 
be considered. 
(2) Culture. A system should welcome dissent (or tolerate disagreement) and encourage 
resolution of conflict at the lowest possible level through direct negotiation. 
(3) Multiple access points. Users of a system should be able to identify, and have access to, the 
person, department, or entity most capable (in terms of authority, knowledge, and experience) 
of managing the problem in question. 
(4) Multiple options. A system should allow users the choice of more than one option for 
resolving a problem or dispute; more specifically, a system should contain both rights-based and 
interest-based options for addressing conflict. 
(5) Support structures. A system requires support structures that are capable of coordinating 
                                                          
22 Karl Slaikeu & Ralph H. Hasson, Controlling the Costs of Conflict: How to Design a System For Your Organization 
(1998); William Ury et al., Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict (1998); J.M. 
Brett et al., Managing Conflict: The Strategy of Dispute Systems Design, 6 Bus. Wk. Executive Briefing Service 
(1994); Costantino & Merchant, supra note 4. 
23 ADR in the Workplace, Track I Committee, supra note 4. The senior author of this paper was a member of the 
Committee. 
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and managing the multiple access points and multiple options; the structure should integrate 
effective conflict management into the organization's daily operations. 
 Designers of systems need to pay particular attention to questions of fairness. The SPIDR 
committee, after considerable debate, reached agreement on the eight essential elements of a fair 
conflict management system: (1) to the extent possible, participation in a system should be voluntary; 
(2) the privacy and confidentiality of the processes should be protected to the fullest extent allowed by 
law; (3) neutrals (mediators, arbitrators, ombudspersons, etc.) should be neutral and impartial; (4) 
neutrals should be adequately trained and qualified; (5) the legitimacy of a system is enhanced to the 
extent that it is "characterized by diversity in the core of neutrals, including mediators and arbitrators"; 
(6) a system should have policies that specifically prohibit any form of reprisal or retaliation; (7) a system 
must be consistent with an organization's existing contracts, including collective bargaining agreements; 
and (8) a system must not undermine the statutory or constitutional rights of the disputants. 
 In our own research we have found some of the corporations that claim to have conflict 
management systems would not meet all the criteria prescribed by the SPIDR committee. In American 
corporations today, a system of the type prescribed by SPIDR is more the ideal than the reality. We have 
studied corporations that we believe have systems, even though they may fall short of the ideal 
recommended by the SPIDR committee. On the basis of our own research, we have found that 
corporations with systems also have the following characteristics: (1) the organization's approach to 
conflict management is proactive rather than reactive: the corporation has moved from waiting for 
disputes to occur to preventing (if possible) or anticipating disputes before they arise; (2) the 
responsibility for conflict (or litigation) management is not confined to the counsel's office or to an 
outside law firm, but is shared by all levels of management; (3) the responsibility for preventing and 
resolving conflict is, therefore, delegated to the lowest feasible level of the organization; (4) managers 
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are held accountable for the successful prevention or resolution of conflict, and the reward and 
performance review systems in the organization reflect this managerial duty; (5) education and training 
in relevant conflict management skills is an ongoing activity of the organization; and (6) managers use 
the experience they have gained in preventing or resolving conflict to improve the policies and 
performance of the organization. 
 Some corporations and organizations are well-known for their development and use of conflict 
management systems: General Electric, Nestle USA, the U.S. Postal Service, Johnson and Johnson, and 
the Bureau of National Affairs come quickly to mind.24 Included in our study are several corporations 
that have all or most of the essential elements of an authentic conflict management system: Alcoa, 
Chevron, PECO Energy, and Prudential. Alcoa has a program called "Resolve It" that incorporates many 
of the features of a system previously described, including multiple options and multiple access points, 
voluntary participation, the right to representation, protection against retaliation, and an ongoing 
commitment to training. In our interviews at Alcoa we learned that the development of its system was 
triggered in large part by the corporation's downsizing in the 1980s, which was accompanied by a rash 
of lawsuits. Alcoa's success with the use of ADR in employment disputes has led to the corporation 
exploring ways to incorporate ADR provisions into its commercial contracts. In addition, Alcoa has 
pioneered the use of a fixed-price contract with its outside counsel: Alcoa and its principal outside law 
firm negotiate a yearly fee for the firm's services that covers all cases handled by the firm. This 
                                                          
24 Lisa B. Bingham et al., Mediating Employment Disputes at the United States Postal Service: A Comparison of In-
House and Outside Neutral Mediator Models, 20 Rev. Pub. Personnel Admin. (2000), infra at Chapter 38; Lisa B. 
Bingham, Mediating Employment Disputes: Perceptions of REDRESS at the United States Postal Service, 17 Rev. 
Pub. Personnel Admin. 20. (1997); F. Peter Phillips, Problem Solving and Dispute Resolution in the Workplace 
(unpublished paper prepared for Employment Law and Litigation Update 2000, Georgetown University Law Center, 
Washington, DC, March 30-31, 2000). 
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arrangement clearly strengthens the law firm's incentive to resolve cases as quickly as possible and, 
accordingly, predisposes the firm's attorneys to favor ADR. 
 Chevron has a comprehensive program similar to Alcoa's but also gives employees access to an 
ombudsperson. A large class-action sex discrimination case was one of the factors motivating Chevron 
to adopt an employment conflict management system. PECO Energy is a utility company heavily 
committed to the use of nuclear power.25 An accident at one of the corporation's nuclear facilities, 
which was followed by several major lawsuits and a considerable amount of unwanted publicity, was an 
event that helped to precipitate the corporation's adoption of ADR. 
 Similarly, Prudential was the object of a series of embarrassing lawsuits and SEC investigations in 
the 1990s. One lawsuit resulted in Prudential agreeing to pay $2 billion to over one million policyholders 
who sought restitution for abuses in the company's life insurance sales practices.26 Top management 
responded to this crisis by resolving that the company would adhere strictly to a code of ethics. It 
established an independent ethics office whose head reports directly to the CEO. To improve 
employment relations, the company came to believe that a comprehensive and fair dispute resolution 
system was needed, and it viewed such a system as an expression of its renewed commitment to ethical 
behavior. It hired Ernst & Young to conduct a benchmarking study of dispute resolution systems in other 
organizations. After a year's work, the consulting firm submitted its report and recommendations to 
Prudential, which the company adopted and implemented. Prudential's system contains almost all the 
elements recommended by the SPIDR committee. Noteworthy is the fact that the system is operated by 
                                                          
25 Agis Salpukas, Peco and Unicom to Merge in Big Bet on Nuclear Power, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1999, at C5. PECO 
Energy merged with the Unicom Corporation to form Exelon in 2000. 
26 Coverage by the press of Prudential's troubles was extensive. See, e.g., Corporate Focus: Uncertainty Clouds 
Prudential's Settlement Process, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1998. 
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an autonomous office within the organization, headed by an experienced and respected attorney who 
also reports directly to the CEO. 
 The emergence of conflict management systems in American corporations is such a recent 
phenomenon it is difficult, if not impossible, to gauge the success of such initiatives. Our respondents at 
these corporations have told us that to date their experience has been favorable, by which they usually 
mean that participants in these systems (managers, employees, customers, suppliers, etc.) have said 
they have had satisfactory experiences using these systems. Our respondents report, further, that most 
complaints are resolved early in the procedures and few end up being resolved by outside neutrals. They 
have also reported that, contrary to the expectations of some skeptics, making elaborate procedures 
available for employees and others does not promote the filing of complaints. On the other hand, we 
have not been able to quantify the costs and benefits of using systems and cannot provide bottom-line 
measures of the effectiveness of the systems' strategy. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
 In this section we discuss the environmental factors, shown in Figure 1, that we hypothesize are 
independent variables influencing the corporation's choice of a conflict management strategy. 
Market Competition 
 Our field research strongly suggests that an important environmental shift that has changed 
businesses' approach to dispute resolution is the competitive pressures brought about by the 
globalization of the economy. Over the past twenty years, increasing competitive pressure has caused 
corporations to examine every facet of their operations in an attempt to minimize all costs and achieve 
every conceivable efficiency. Internal counsel has not been immune to that pressure. Once seen as a 
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cost, not necessarily controllable, legal expenses could now be managed, much as businesses attempted 
to manage the cost of materials, human resources, and marketing. This has caused pressure to be 
placed upon general counsel to manage their internal costs, and their management of external counsel, 
in a much more efficient way. Under this regime, litigation expenses are not costs that just occur, but 
rather costs to be minimized whenever possible. 
Government Regulation 
 In its 1994 report, the Dunlop Commission noted two related but distinct problems in 
contemporary employment law. "The first is a steep rise in administrative regulation of the workplace, 
whose overlapping mandates (both federal and state) impose significant costs on employers and 
employees. The second is the explosion of litigation under laws that rely in whole or in part on individual 
lawsuits for enforcement."27 Regarding the growth of the statutory regulation of employment relations, 
at the same time that employees' collective rights were weakened by the decline of unionization, their 
individual rights were strengthened through a series of federal and state statutes. In the employment 
area, for example, between 1960 and 1990, Congress passed at least two dozen major statutes. The 
starting point for this trend is generally accepted to be the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 
followed quickly by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. After a lull during the Reagan years, Congress passed 
the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Family and Medical 
Leave Act in 1993.  
 As the Dunlop Commission recognized, it is important to realize that statutory regulations 
impose costs on employers that are independent of their effects on litigation. That is, there are 
                                                          
27 Comm. on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, supra note 2, at 49. 
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overhead or fixed costs associated with many forms of statutory regulation. For example, a new 
employment statute almost always has staffing and organizational consequences for major employers. 
Lawyers in the corporate counsel's office and human resources managers need to understand the 
implications of the new statute for their organization. New staff may need to be added to both functions 
and the organization may need to lean more heavily on outside counsel, consultants, trainers, and 
educators. That regulations impose costs on employers is a truism that does not need elaboration here, 
although the magnitude of those costs and the scale of potential benefits are always matters of serious 
debate. It is sufficient to note for our purposes that the steep rise in statutory employment regulations 
prompted employers to seek methods of minimizing the effect of these regulations on their cost of 
doing business. For many employers ADR seemed to be an obvious method of minimizing such costs. 
Litigation Trend 
 A principal cause of the rise of ADR in the United States, many observers believe, is the 
perceived "litigation explosion" that began in the 1960s and, some contend, continues to this day.28 
"Proponents of this view tend to focus primarily on the growth of torts, especially personal injury claims 
based on product liability theories."29 But they also note that business litigation has expanded in other 
areas as well, including employment, civil rights, contractual, and environmental disputes. The growing 
statutory regulation of employment gave rise to new areas of litigation, ranging from sexual harassment 
and accommodation of the disabled to age discrimination and wrongful termination. More and more 
dimensions of the employment relationship were brought under the scrutiny not only of the court 
system but of a multitude of regulatory agencies. 
                                                          
28 Patrick M. Garry, A Nation of Adversaries: How the Litigation Explosion Is Reshaping America (1997). 
29 Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-
1991, 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 497, 498 (1996). 
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 Proponents of the view that there has been a litigation explosion cite the fact that since the 
1960s litigation increased approximately seven times faster than the national population. An estimated 
thirty million civil cases are now on the dockets of federal, state, and local courts, a number that has 
grown dramatically in recent years. The U.S. has about five percent of the world's population but 
seventy percent of the world's lawyers.30 A 1994 survey by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin estimated that tort 
liability cost the U.S. $152 billion a year.31 In the last two decades, the number of suits filed in federal 
courts concerning employment matters grew by four-hundred percent.32 In the decade of the 1990s, the 
number of civil cases in U.S. federal courts involving charges of discrimination nearly tripled. Plaintiffs 
who won their employment discrimination suits received a median award of $200,000 in 1996; one in 
nine received an award of $1 million or more.33 
 The purported increase in business and employment litigation has been accompanied by delays 
in the settlement of such cases. According to the Dunlop Commission, "Overburdened federal and state 
judicial dockets mean that years often pass before an aggrieved employee is able to present his or her 
claim in court."34 In 1994, a panel of nine federal judges commissioned by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States noted that the huge increases in the caseload of the federal courts had further slowed the 
already languid rate of processing civil cases.35 In sum, the litigation explosion clogged the dockets of 
federal and state courts in the U.S., leading to longer delays and higher costs in the use of traditional 
means of dispute resolution.  
                                                          
30 Garry, supra note 28, at 15-16. 
31 Stephen Gold, Step Ladders and Lawsuits, Wash. Times, Nov. 21, 1997. 
32 U.S. Comm. on the Future of Worker-Management Relations ("The Dunlop Commission"), Report and 
Recommendations (1994), pp. 25-33. 
33 33U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Complaints in U.S. District Courts, 1990-98, Bureau of Justice Statistics 
Special Report 1-13 (2000). 
34 Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, supra note 2, at 50. 
35 Id. 
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Some have challenged whether there has been, in fact, a significant increase in litigation. For 
example, one study examined federal litigation involving the 2,000 largest U.S. corporations during the 
period 1971-1991.36 The study concluded that the litigation explosion is largely a myth. "It may have had 
some credibility ten years ago, near the peak of the post-1971 rise in litigation levels, but it has much 
less now. [In] most major categories of litigation, filings have actually declined in recent years. If there 
ever was a 'litigation explosion' affecting business in the federal courts, it has generally subsided."37 
Although this research undermines the conventional wisdom to some extent, it does not paint a 
complete picture: obviously, by confining the analysis to the largest corporations, the study leaves open 
the question of litigation trends for smaller businesses. They also omit trends in state courts and in state 
and federal regulatory agencies from their analysis of business litigation. More importantly, perhaps, is 
the strong perception, confirmed by the interviews we have conducted with corporate managers and 
lawyers, that corporations are much more likely to be defendants in civil litigation of all types than they 
were a generation ago. That perception, regardless of whether it is based in reality or not, has translated 
into action for many businesses, as they seek to gain more control over the litigation process and its 
results. 
Legal and Tort Reform 
 Frustration with the growing burden of litigation led many in the business community to oppose 
various federal measures to regulate the employment relationship and to lobby for tort (or legal) 
reforms that would limit the ability of one party to sue another. Proposed measures have included 
limitations on damages, "loser pays" requirements, caps on contingency fees charged by lawyers, 
restrictions on class action suits, and other measures. Leading business organizations, including the 
                                                          
36 Dunworth & Rogers, supra note 29. 
37 Id. at 558-59. 
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National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, became proponents of tort 
reform. The American Tort Reform Association, also representing business interests, played a major role 
in the public relations and lobbying efforts to achieve reforms preferred by the business community. 
Corporations and their allies often join forces with the Republican Party to press for tort reform, 
although the issue was never framed entirely along conventional political lines. 
 Trial lawyers, civil rights organizations, labor unions, and other liberal groups usually oppose the 
push for tort reform. Most, but certainly not all, Democratic Party lawmakers either opposed reform or 
were selective in their support of reform measures. Opponents of tort reform argue either that there 
hasn't been an authentic litigation explosion or that if there has been one, it has served a useful social 
purpose.38 
 The movement for tort reform may have crested with the election of a Republican majority in 
the 104th Congress. The Republican Party's "Contract with America" contained a provision pledging the 
party to support reform that would curtail the flood of "frivolous lawsuits and outlandish damage 
rewards [that] make a mockery of our civil justice system."39 Congressional Republicans, however, failed 
to achieve comprehensive tort reform, although piecemeal measures were passed and signed into law 
by President Clinton. At the state level the movement for tort reform has also had mixed and limited 
success. 
 We believe the growth of ADR over the last two decades is closely related to the movement for 
tort reform. The corporate interest in both ADR and tort reform is motivated by the same set of factors: 
the belief that there has been a dramatic growth in litigation resulting in an ever-increasing burden of 
                                                          
38 Samuel Jan Brakel, Using What We Know About our Civil Litigation System: A Critique of 'Base-Rate' Analysis and 
Other Apologist Diversions, at http://www.lawsch.uga.edu/~galawrev/vol31/brakel.html (Mar. 24,1999). 
39 Yesim Yilmaz, Private Regulation: A Real Alternative for Regulatory Reform, 303 
Pol. Analysis 1-34 (Apr. 20, 1998). 
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legal costs borne by American business. In the corporate mind tort reform and ADR are also linked to 
the perception that there is excessive government regulation and a need to strip away this excess. 
Arguably, ADR, tort reform, and deregulation are complimentary efforts by corporate America. One can 
hypothesize that if the business community had achieved the comprehensive tort reform it sought, 
accompanied by the thorough elimination of objectionable regulations, the corporate interest in ADR 
would be much less intense. That is, ADR and tort reform are to some degree substitutes for one 
another, and the corporate failure to achieve its objectives on tort reform has probably intensified the 
corporate interest in ADR. 
 On the other hand, it would be a mistake to believe that the various interests supporting tort 
reform were identical to those supporting ADR. Our research suggests that many corporate managers 
and lawyers believe there is a crisis in our legal system and yet they do not favor ADR. The most 
conservative spokespersons, who are often allied with the corporate community, are often staunch 
advocates of tort reform but oppose the use of ADR. (The Cato Institute, as represented by articles 
appearing in its publication, Regulation, would be an example.) They believe systemic change in the legal 
system is required and ADR is merely a palliative. By contrast, more moderate elements of the corporate 
community may support tort reform but believe it is even more important to develop effective means of 
managing disputes. 
Statutory Requirements and Court Mandates 
 The Congress and most state legislatures have a long history of encouraging, and occasionally 
mandating, the use of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and other private methods of resolving 
disputes. We need not document that history here but merely note that key landmarks include the 
Federal Arbitration Act of 1926, as well as the Railway Labor Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and 
other federal statutes regulating labor-management relations. Federal and state courts have usually 
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supported statutory measures designed to promote the private resolution of disputes. Most notably in 
labor relations, after World War II, the courts increasingly deferred to arbitration as a means of settling 
disputes.40 
 When the ADR movement gained momentum in the 1970s, the courts proved to be equally 
supportive. In its seminal Gilmer decision in 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a stock broker who 
had agreed to the New York Stock Exchange's rule requiring arbitration of employment disputes 
between brokers and member firms could not sue his employer for an alleged violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act but instead must arbitrate the dispute.41 Since Gilmer, most federal 
appellate courts in the U.S. (with the notable exception of the Ninth Circuit) have applied the principle in 
that case in other industries in a variety of employment statutes.42 
 Over time both federal and state courts have adopted so-called "court-annexed" ADR 
procedures designed to expedite the litigation process. Early neutral evaluation, summary jury trial, 
arbitration, fact-finding, and mediation are some of the most common ADR techniques that have been 
adopted by the courts. As Fitz Gibbon notes, "Court annexed ADR is a simple and predictable response 
to the increased use of litigation to resolve disputes and to solve societal problems. It builds on proven 
and traditional methods of extrajudicial settlement; it reflects the fact that parties frequently settle their 
differences even after they [have] resorted to court and commenced litigation."43 The court systems in 
more than half the states now encourage, or even mandate the use of court-annexed ADR procedures to 
                                                          
40 This is especially seen in the Supreme Court's Steelworker Trilogy: Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co, 363 U.S. 564 
(1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car 
Corp. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 28-47 (5th ed. 1991). 
41 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
42 Among the numerous analyses of the law in this area, see Delikat & Kathawala, supra note 7; Trachte-Huber & 
Huber, supra note 2, at 741-73. 
43 Susan FitzGibbon, Appellate Settlement Conference Programs: A Case Study, in Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
Strategies for Law and Business, at 977 (E. Wendy Trachte-Huber and Stephen K. Huber eds. 1996). 
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reduce backlogs and speed up the handling of disputes. In many states the use of these procedures has 
especially taken root in the management of family disputes but more recently has spread to most types 
of civil cases. 
 The support that ADR has received in the courts has been buttressed by federal and state 
statutes designed to promote or require its use. Although the effort to achieve federal tort reform has 
not yet succeeded, legislators and policymakers have not been oblivious to the stresses being felt in the 
American legal system. In 1990, for example, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act, which 
required federal district courts to experiment with case management systems. The net effect of this 
statute was to encourage the courts to institute various forms of ADR. In 1998 Congress took the next 
step, requiring federal district courts to use ADR. In recent years Congress has frequently added ADR 
provisions to statutes it has passed, usually allowing claimants the option of using mediation before 
turning to the appropriate regulatory agency or the courts for resolution. Administrative agencies, such 
as the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have begun to require the use of ADR 
(usually mediation) to resolve complaints.44 Recently the U.S. Department of Labor established a pilot 
program to test the efficacy of using mediation to resolve enforcement cases arising under the many 
statutes administered by the Department. (The Department made a grant to the Alliance for Education 
in Dispute Resolution to develop, manage, and evaluate this program.) In addition, many state 
administrative agencies have experimented with ADR as a response to the costs and delays inherent in 
their systems. 
                                                          
44 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy Statement (1995). See 
also Paul Steven Miller, EEOC Adopts ADR Methods, Disp. Resol. J. 17, 87 (1995). 
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 In sum, judicial and legislative support of the use of ADR has contributed to the permissive 
environment in which American businesses have developed their ADR policies over the past two 
decades. 
Unionization 
 An important long-run change in the fabric of corporate life has been the decreasing likelihood 
of any plant or facility within a corporation being unionized.45 The American labor movement's 
membership as a proportion of the labor forced peaked in the early post-World War II period and has 
declined steadily for more than forty years. In the year 2000, only eleven percent of the total workforce 
were union members; the proportion of the private sector workforce unionized had fallen to eight 
percent. Some experts believe that there are signs that the further decline of unionization is unlikely, 
but agree that there is no sign of a significant upturn.46 
 On the one hand, the decline in unionization has generally been welcomed by corporations. On 
the other hand, the lack of a formal method of dispute resolution for day-to-day employment problems 
has led some companies to conclude that unresolved conflicts have their price as well. Almost all 
collective bargaining agreements in the United States incorporate a grievance procedure for handling 
disputes over the application or interpretation of those agreements. The grievance procedure almost 
always provides for the use of arbitration to resolve grievances that have not been settled earlier in the 
procedure. Many unionized employers became accustomed to relying on these formal procedures for 
resolving employment disputes and, indeed, even came to see the advantages of their use. In the 
absence of grievance and arbitration procedures, employees alleging either statutory or contractual 
                                                          
45 Harry C. Katz & Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations 118-23 
(2000). 
46 See, e.g., id. at 137. 
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violations by their employers need to resolve such disputes by bringing suit against their employer. The 
simultaneous decline of unionization and rise of ADR was, we maintain, more than a coincidence. Many 
nonunion employers came to realize that the use of some form of employment ADR provided a faster 
and cheaper means of resolving disputes than conventional litigation.47 
 Unions have viewed the use of ADR in employment relations with some skepticism. Many 
unions fear that employers often institute workplace dispute resolution systems as a means of avoiding 
unionization. Because most employers will not freely admit to anti-union motives, hard evidence on this 
concern is lacking. In the course of our field research, however, several of our corporate respondents 
readily admitted that union avoidance was a principal motive for their use of ADR in employment 
relations. Although labor's fears are, in some cases, justified, many unions have supported the 
development of workplace dispute resolution systems that extend beyond the traditional grievance 
procedure. For example, certain employee concerns, ranging from the quality of their relations with 
supervisors and fellow employees to the adequacy of their computers and office equipment, are not 
usually matters that are easily handled through the grievance procedure. Some unions have discovered 
that employee complaints that fall outside the purview of the mandatory topics of bargaining may be 
addressed effectively through a dispute resolution system designed jointly by the parties. Indeed, some 
unions have embraced ADR with enthusiasm, not only valuing its potential benefits for its members but 
also recognizing that ADR systems can extend the authority and influence of a union into areas normally 
considered management prerogatives.48 
 
                                                          
47 Trachte-Huber & Huber, supra note 2 at 9-29. 
48 David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Resolving Workplace Disputes in the United States: The Growth of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment Relations, 2 J. Alt. Disp. Resol. Emp. 37 (2000). 




 Continuing with our explication of the model depicted in Figure 1, we now turn to the role of 
organizational factors in determining the corporation's choice of a conflict management strategy. 
Corporate Culture 
 We have referred to the important role corporate culture plays in determining conflict 
management strategies in earlier sections of this paper. Corporate cultures "provide organizational 
members with more or less articulated sets of ideas that help them individually and collectively to cope 
with all of [the organization's] uncertainties and ambiguities. People in organizations, as in social life 
generally, generate ideologies that tell them what is, how it got that way, and what ought to be. Such 
ideologies form the substance of cultures."49 In conducting our field studies, we were struck by the 
differences in the cultures and ideologies of the various organizations we visited. Many other 
researchers, of course, have observed the same phenomenon.50 It seems obvious to us that there is a 
close relationship between the culture of a corporation and the nature of its choice of conflict 
management strategy. 
 Culture is such an enormous all-encompassing concept, and clearly we cannot do justice to the 
role it plays in determining corporate strategy in this paper. We can, however, briefly examine one 
aspect of culture and its relation to strategy: the extent to which authority relationships in a corporation 
are hierarchical and authoritarian versus the extent to which they are nonhierarchical and egalitarian.51 
We hypothesize that conflict management systems are more likely to emerge in egalitarian 
organizations than in hierarchical ones. We discovered in our case studies that the widespread adoption 
                                                          
49 Harrison M. Trice & Janice M. Beyer, The Cultures of Work Organizations 1-2 (1993). 
50 See, e.g., Terrence E. Deal & Allan A. Kennedy, Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life (1982); 
Trice & Beyer, supra note 49, at 33-76. 
51 Id. at 66-67, 235-37. 
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by employers of team-based production has created a substantial need for effective conflict resolution 
as well. In traditional hierarchical work organizations employers can usually (but admittedly not always) 
rely on their authority to minimize and resolve conflicts. But when employers reorganize their workers 
into teams — and particularly when they introduce the use of so-called "high performance work 
systems" — they give up a considerable amount of their authority and control over their own 
employees. In organizations in which there are authentic work teams, the employees themselves 
assume major responsibility for preventing, negotiating, and resolving conflicts. Some corporations that 
use teams, however, have realized that the creation of more formal dispute resolution systems 
enhances the effectiveness of their teams.52 
Management Commitment 
 During the course of our research, it became clear to us that the role of top management in 
shaping the corporation's conflict management strategy cannot be overestimated. We heard several 
stories about CEOs who usually paid little attention to conflict management, but focused intently on the 
topic after the corporation experienced a major, expensive, lawsuit, or a crisis involving the legal 
function. In some cases we also heard stories about CEOs becoming concerned about the ongoing costs 
of the corporation's legal affairs and directing a significant budget cut for the counsel's function. In one 
case, a CEO ordered the downsizing of several staff functions, including the counsel's office, and the 
counsel reacted by adopting strongly pro-ADR policies, which he believed would help him stay within 
the bounds of his smaller budget. In some corporations the Chief Financial Officer, concerned about the 
corporation's litigation costs, became the organization's most ardent ADR champion. 
                                                          
52 Thomas A. Kochan, Harry C. Katz, & Robert B. McKersie, The Transformation of American Industrial Relations 
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 It should be clear that management commitment is a two-sided variable, as are the other 
variables in our model. That is, management can be committed to either a pro-ADR or a pro-litigation 
strategy. In the case of Emerson, management was clearly committed to a pro-litigation strategy. In 
some cases, past experiences with mediation or arbitration helped to shape management's attitudes. 
Some of our interviewees revealed to us that they had become interested in conflict management 
through a single or small number of ADR experiences. Often, they were exposed to mediation or 
arbitration as an experiment in dealings with another company. They were satisfied with the result and 
attempted to replicate it in their own company. This mechanism does not always work to create an 
atmosphere in which ADR flourishes, however. A small number of companies we surveyed told us that 
their past experiences with ADR had been negative or simply not good enough to cause them to seek to 
manage conflict in this manner. 
 In a handful of cases we confess we could not fathom why management had a pro-ADR or a pro-
litigation attitude. For example, we visited two companies that were very similar in many respects but 
the CEO of the one company was strongly committed to ADR while the CEO of the other company was 
strongly opposed to ADR. We suspect that ideology and personality differences helped to shape these 
contrasting attitudes. 
The Role of the Champion 
 Another key feature of the organizations that were developing integrated conflict management 
systems was the role of key internal champions. In virtually all of our interviews with companies with 
conflict management systems, the interviewees would point to a single or a very small group of 
individuals who were responsible for initiating and maintaining the system in the early stages of its 
development. As Ulrich notes, a champion is a change agent, that is, a person within an organization 
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dedicated to the "cultural transformation" of the organization.53 Champions, Ulrich says, play four roles: 
they are sponsors of the change they advocate; they help facilitate the change by obtaining internal 
support, external support, and management ownership; they help design the change; and they 
demonstrate, by example, experiments, and pilot efforts, the superiority of the change they advocate.54 
The role of the champion underscores, however, the fragility of systems development in this arena. 
Champions are often faced with powerful opponents within the organization. In one of the organizations 
we studied, the ADR champion in the counsel's office was opposed by the anti-ADR director of human 
resources. The ADR champion lost the battle and left the organization. When the champion leaves his or 
her position or moves to another organization, the entire ADR effort may be thwarted if no one steps 
into the champion's role. 
Exposure Profile 
 One of the factors that lead to a more aggressive business response to the litigation explosion is 
the amount of potential litigation exposure faced by an individual firm. This "exposure profile" of a 
particular corporation is a function of the industry in which it operates, the firm's history, the nature of 
employment in the firm (particularly whether the jobs it offers are high-risk or low-risk), and its 
relationships with other businesses and consumers. Some firms, for example, are in industries that make 
inherently dangerous products, or products that have been associated with class actions in the recent 
past. Other firms have been accused of, and sometimes found liable for, business practices that have led 
to widespread litigation. Firms vary by size of employment and unionization, which leaves some very 
large nonunion firms with significant potential litigation exposure. Some firms have a large number of 
business relationships which, because of the pressure of time, simply cannot be allowed to result in 
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costly and time-consuming litigation. Finally, some firms have so many business transactions that could 
sour and lead to litigation — consumer transactions involving relatively expensive goods for example — 
that they are highly exposed to litigation. In sum, we hypothesize that the higher the corporation's 
exposure profile, the more likely it is, all other things being equal, that the corporation will adopt a 
conflict management system. 
The Precipitating Event 
 In many of the corporations we studied, we found that the company was motivated to consider 
the adoption of an ADR strategy because of a "precipitating event" — a multi-million dollar lawsuit, a 
series of lawsuits, or some type of crisis or catastrophe, that led to lawsuits and a public relations 
problem for the corporation. As previously noted, companies such as PECO Energy and Prudential 
adopted sophisticated conflict management systems largely because they had been the object of 
lawsuits causing considerable embarrassment for the corporations. Alcoa moved in the direction of a 
conflict management system after downsizing its workforce resulted in a series of expensive lawsuits. In 
most corporations top management doesn't interfere with counsel's day-to-day management of the 
legal function. But an expensive lawsuit will most definitely attract the attention of the CEO and other 
top managers. Major lawsuits are often the occasion for top management to review the corporation's 
conflict management strategies and policies. Such reviews frequently reveal the costly and time-
consuming nature of litigation, and prompt top managers to seek alternatives. In some corporations the 
counsel's office may have been promoting the use of ADR on an ad hoc basis for many years but was 
only able to adopt the use of ADR as a matter of corporate strategy after the corporation faced a major 
crisis. An expensive lawsuit, however, doesn't always lead to the corporation's adoption of pro-ADR 
policies, as the Schering-Plough example illustrates. 
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 If our hypothesis about the relationship between precipitating events and conflict management 
strategies is correct, it constitutes yet another example of how corporate policy is often based on 
managers' experience with — and desire to avoid — worse-case scenarios, rather than policy being 
based on the corporation's normal (or median) experience. 
 
DOES EXPERIMENTATION BECOME INSTITUTIONALIZED? 
 In this paper, we have described a number of examples of ADR policies and systems in various 
stages of development and formality. We have difficulty concluding, however, that any of the 
corporations we have studied have reached the stage of institutionalizing their ADR systems, even those 
we include in the prevent category. By "institutionalization" we mean a system or function that has 
become a more or less permanent part of the fabric of the organization, in the same sense that 
functions such as marketing, finance, human resources, and the counsel's office itself. As we've noted, 
ADR policies and practices are relatively recent corporate phenomenon, developed largely in response 
to certain shifts in the environment of the corporation. The emergence of corporate conflict 
management systems is an even more recent phenomenon. When we began our investigation, we 
expected to find the diffusion of ADR experiments across firms, particularly firms within the same 
industry. We also expected to find that the corporation's adoption of ADR techniques for one type of 
dispute would lead to the adoption of those techniques for other types of disputes. For example, if a 
corporation had successfully used ADR in consumer disputes, we expected it to use ADR in employment 
and environmental disputes. In other words, we hypothesized the existence of an integrated conflict 
management strategy within the organization. 
  Development of Conflict Management 
Systems, 45 
 
 In fact, however, we did not observe either diffusion or integration in our research — certainly 
not to the extent we expected. Many of the corporations we have studied engage in a considerable 
amount of benchmarking, keeping close tabs on the conflict management practices and strategies of 
other companies, particularly in the same industry. But benchmarking doesn't necessarily lead to 
diffusion; indeed, it can deter diffusion, if the corporation doing the benchmarking concludes another 
corporation's experience with a particular practice has been less than satisfactory. At times a 
corporation's adoption of ADR policies seems idiosyncratic, dependent on the values and inclinations of 
the CEO, the evangelizing of an effective champion, or some other factor unique to the corporation. 
 Frankly, we were surprised at the lack of "integration" in many of the corporations we studied. 
The variance in conflict or litigation management within a corporation can be quite astonishing. The 
employment counsel might be an ardent ADR champion but the firm's chief litigator might be anti-ADR. 
Of course, variance in conflict management within a corporation can be a perfectly rational response to 
differences in the corporation's objectives and values in different types of disputes. 
 What factors have prevented the institutionalization of ADR systems in American corporations? 
There are many possible explanations for this lack of institutionalization of ADR. In this section we will 
explore a few of the hypotheses we believe have the most credibility. Consider, first, the environmental 
factors that appear to have brought about the rise of ADR. Over the past twenty years, changes in these 
factors all served to buttress the business case for ADR, but all of these factors could potentially move in 
the opposite direction, thus undercutting the case for ADR. For example, global competition intensified 
dramatically over the last two or three decades, but it is not certain that global competition will have the 
same influence on corporate strategy in the future that it had in the past. Given the increasingly chronic 
weakness of the Japanese economy and other Asian economies, global competition may not be the 
same spur to corporate action that it once was. Also, government regulation, particularly of 
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employment relations, grew dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, helping to fuel the alleged litigation 
explosion. But clearly the Bush administration is not disposed to favor the further regulation of 
American business. If market competition and government regulation have reached a plateau, two 
important factors that brought about the rise of ADR will no longer be significant. 
 We noted in an earlier section of the paper that some scholars questioned the validity of the 
litigation explosion. By most measures, the upward trend in litigation probably came to an end a decade 
ago and caseloads in most courts have leveled off. Ironically, the success of ADR may be partly 
responsible for that, and although tort reform hasn't been enacted at the federal level, it has advanced 
steadily at the state level. (Recent efforts in Congress to pass a "Patients Bill of Rights," giving patients 
the right to sue their HMOs, may trigger a new wave of litigation.) The courts themselves, at both the 
federal and state level, have made strenuous efforts to introduce internal reforms and most now have 
established ADR programs. If there is any prospect of a litigation "implosion" and if the courts succeed in 
improving their management of litigation, the impetus for corporations to institutionalize ADR will be 
substantially diminished. 
 As unlikely as it may seem, some of the employment trends that have favored the development 
of ADR could be reversed as well. For example, the reemergence of the union movement as a significant 
institution in the private sector would almost certainly decrease corporate interest in ADR programs. 
Also, it seems clear that we are at or near the end of the expansion of individual employment rights 
through state and federal legislation. Any or all of these changes would make ADR marginally less 
attractive to many corporations. 
 There are other factors within the corporation that deter the institutionalization of ADR 
programs and systems. Consider, for example, the phenomenon of the "precipitating event": some of 
our interviewees noted that the further into the past a precipitated event receded, the less compelling 
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that event was as a factor motivating the corporation's development of an ADR program. To the extent 
that the creation of an ADR program is the corporation's short-term response to a crisis, the foundation 
for institutionalizing such a program remains tenuous. Moreover, as we noted earlier, we have found 
very little evidence of the diffusion of ADR policies and practices across dispute areas within firms. 
Nearly all of the firms we have studied confine the use of ADR to certain types of disputes. For example, 
conflict management systems of the type we've described in this paper are most frequently used in 
employment relations. They are almost never used — and indeed would have little application — to 
other types of disputes. (Arguably, a conflict management system might be useful in customer, client, 
and vendor relationships, but it is difficult to imagine the use of a system, as we've defined it, to 
financial disputes.) When we asked our respondents whether their corporation planned to apply an ADR 
strategy they were using in one dispute area to a different dispute area, most said they did not really 
consider it a possibility. Indeed, we cannot cite a single example of a corporate that employs a truly 
integrated and consistent strategy toward all disputes it potentially faces. On the basis of our case 
studies, we conclude that the vast majority of corporations favor dispute management over conflict 
management. 
 The vast majority of corporations in the United States have adopted ADR in one form or another 
because they hoped ADR would save time and money. In our survey of the Fortune 1000, about eighty 
percent of the respondents told us "saving time" or "saving money" were the primary reasons the 
corporation had used ADR.55 In fact, however, there is very little hard evidence that corporations 
actually do save time and money by using ADR. It is not clear to us that many corporations are even 
gathering the information necessary to make a cost-benefit analysis. In our interviews we pressed our 
respondents to tell us what they were doing in this regard, and most gave us vague responses or 
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admitted they weren't doing much. Some corporations apparently do have internal tracking systems 
(Alcoa and the FMC Corporation come to mind). But we were consistently surprised at the lack of 
rigorous data collection and analysis of ADR within corporations. The lack of analysis is in part a 
consequence of the fact that there is no accepted paradigm in the dispute resolution field for 
conducting the analysis. The task of developing appropriate metrics in dispute resolution has not yet 
been undertaken, and until it is measuring the success (or failure) of ADR will be problematic. 
 We noted earlier the important role that champions have played in developing ADR systems 
within corporations. In the course of our research we have met many champions, and we admire almost 
all of them. It often takes courage to be a champion within an organization. But the critical role played 
by a champion works against the institutionalization of an ADR program. Time and again we 
encountered champions who had become frustrated and discouraged, and some who had simply given 
up.  
Any movement that relies heavily on the heroic efforts of individual champions is a fragile 
movement indeed. Nevertheless, ADR certainly has become institutionalized in some settings. For 
example, it seems to be a continuing and integral part of a number of firms in the construction industry 
and in the securities industry. What are the conditions most conducive to the institutionalization of 
ADR? Tentatively, we conclude that institutionalization is most likely to occur when (1) the corporation 
faces, on a regular and continuing basis, a large number of the same type of dispute; (2) the disputes do 
not typically involve high stakes, either in terms of money or principle; (3) the disputes involve the 
interpretation and application of contracts rather than statutes; and (4) it becomes indisputably clear to 
the corporation (even if it does not conduct a concrete cost-benefit analysis) that the time and money 
saved from using ADR rather than litigation is highly significant. We do not maintain that these 
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conditions are the only ones that can lead to institutionalization, only that institutionalization is more 
likely when these conditions are present. 
 
A SUMMARY OF OUR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Our research has led us to a conclusion we did not anticipate. Somewhat surprising to us, and 
contrary to much of the popular literature and perceptions regarding ADR, we do not believe the ADR 
movement has achieved the critical mass necessary to institutionalize it within most large businesses or 
other organizations. Although the use of ADR procedures by American corporations is very widespread, 
support for ADR policies in many corporations is confined (often to one or two "champions") and 
frequently hasn't penetrated the upper reaches of management. Unless ADR becomes more imbedded 
in corporate culture, the ADR movement is likely to stall or even retreat in the coming years. 
Specifically, our research has revealed the following: 
(1) In most organizations, ADR is a reactive response rather than a strategic choice. Our corporate 
survey had caused us to believe that a growing number of managers supported ADR policies and 
were creating systems as part of a larger strategy of conflict management. In the case studies 
we have conducted, however, we found that the use of ADR was nearly always an ad hoc 
response to a specific, repetitive set of disputes faced by a business. 
(2) The rise of ADR in American business was the consequence of changes in a set of environmental 
factors (such as the perceived litigation explosion), and a reversal of direction of these factors 
could very well lead to a decline in the use of ADR. Although ADR has been institutionalized in a 
handful of corporations, in the vast majority it has not become part of the corporation's 
standing policies. Without further institutionalization, ADR may prove to be a transitory phase 
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rather than a permanent shift in corporate conflict management. Our survey results and our 
onsite interviews revealed that a number of societal forces have developed over the past twenty 
years or so that had strongly encouraged businesses to consider ADR as a dispute management 
tool. In recent years, however, many of those forces have lost their potency and may even be 
moving in an opposite direction. ADR has not taken such a strong hold in American corporations 
that it cannot easily be abandoned if the environmental reasons for using it disappear. 
(3) Conceptually, it is important to distinguish between dispute management and conflict 
management. Our research demonstrates that dispute management overwhelms conflict 
management as the dominant mode of corporate behavior. When we began our field research, 
we expected to find corporations moving beyond the use of ADR to manage disputes toward the 
establishment of conflict management systems, which in theory have the purpose of preventing 
or eliminating conflicts before they rise to the level of explicit disputes. In fact, with the 
exception of a handful of corporations noted earlier, we have found almost no such behavior on 
the part of U.S. businesses. 
(4) Our corporate survey revealed that companies used ADR for instrumental purposes. That is, 
typically corporate managers and lawyers valued ADR because they believed its use served 
larger corporate objectives. For example, almost all of our interviewees were attracted to ADR 
because of its potential to save time and money through more efficient dispute resolution. 
Almost none of them supported the use of ADR because they thought it was a fairer and more 
just means of resolving disputes. On balance, our corporate respondents believe conventional 
litigation provides better procedural safeguards than ADR, but they were willing to forego these 
safeguards if there was a reasonable chance of saving time and money. 
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 We do not have a crystal ball that allows us to predict with certainty the direction ADR will take 
in the future. We merely want to note that our analytical model suggests that ADR in the corporate 
community may grow in significance in the future, or it may decline, depending on the direction taken 
by the environmental and organizational factors that we believe determine the corporation's choice of a 
conflict management strategy. Our friends in the ADR movement may find our analysis dismaying. We 
hope that, rather than being dismayed, they will resolve to make an even more strenuous effort to 
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